Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 869276c0b3cc5988…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-09-20 06:36:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: c73572cfc9d9bd69c9c2ecfa1479a61f SHA-1: 8b00ab0dd5fa81c753b9147e7a6ed4bb6de6a0e3 SHA-256: 869276c0b3cc598894abd8387f8eda43c9e8e4ec7a89e61ecce44f67634136d2
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample is a PDF document that contains numerous links to external resources, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress sites or disposable domains, suggesting a link farm for SEO poisoning or malware distribution. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal, a common social engineering tactic to bypass macro restrictions and execute malicious commands. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the download and execution of a second-stage payload via the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pistant.ru/uplcv?utm_term=err_connection_reset+android+chrome PDF link annotation
    • https://www.dazzlingdecor.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614716786c866---rajixosobewekonifixamewi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://trainternational.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614477f3eb9b6---gofivad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suncitygroup.ir/basefile/suncitygroupir/files/91419030378.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zespolbahamas.pl/zdjecia/file/kizibodunupadonojatukut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://matfplayer.com/calisma2/files/uploads/bifidiwawilidazedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zonazero.es/userfiles/file/61420884999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://live-lessons.net/lcj/web/uploads/assets/file/velosebilenesabamib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ugyvednok.hu/userfiles/file/juxuzixolab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.skup.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140f81bd62e4---64309965838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://orkhaconstruction.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s1p4jald30bkfedmqj6gb6a786/nidixizivefafopexubabeni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pzhjintai.com/upload/files/43831158836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613f77aac91b3---zozarukulizudusatoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ambulatorioveterinariopisillibertozzi.eu/userfiles/files/gukizalani.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sanfrancescovet.com/userfiles/files/zevelexow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mebizstekla.ru/userfiles/file/pijabidomugodipenagupuguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ribaczpeter.hu/files/file/dukafuzijamawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zhymwz.com/upfile/file/76925876348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://precisionautoandac.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fec82dc145c01496c5d005bd61ec4b11/kajaduge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.brunosistemi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16145758a835fe---dolofanoweb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://askort.pl/Upload/file/45302732366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://laserinnsbruck.com/static/rabidasaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mebelihome.ru/upload_picture/fobozosagitabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://s292376414.onlinehome.fr/datas/imgmail/file/mirelutujikexidoxan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e579.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE579 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fd90.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD90 10604 bytes
SHA-256: fa0f4c88f60e2b3b328aafba8622596beb53569fe2326b06ddd3c7d95a3addc5
font_02_sfnt_off00011596.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11596 18340 bytes
SHA-256: 7ec7fc9c8ca119f63af88a9e64b11876228a9bbcea8daeb3bba59efc3f4b39af

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