Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 868a6ef24ad0dbad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

157.6 KB Created: 2020-08-11 20:48:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: eda48b76825ea0baee3867ce14ca81e0 SHA-1: d2757956e3e5cad8da5ff8e17eb3e1c09cba0467 SHA-256: 868a6ef24ad0dbada1b92b406c4e31512fd447d5f28c6a645a68151e93e7d617
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link disguised as a document title, which redirects to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. The document body and metadata suggest it is a lure for a PDF download, likely to deliver a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=surah%20yunus%20bangla%20translation%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.musictypographer.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070113/dopudeso-lamuxexazabafab-nalabodunubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.communityfarmersmarketbg.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070872/setiwezukusuz-puderojogibado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jackiesedlock.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740598/wagurewuvefudosufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.salon218dayspa.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814387/masuwedosog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6011/7160/files/kingdoms_of_kalamar_3._5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6915/3181/files/wagomumosanejakufuduga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9963/4328/files/70178310109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3422/1466/files/bayesian_statistics_an_introduction.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3325/5323/files/sariwaxesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9699/0105/files/xirogozupusutazesip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1423/4013/files/kudatuloxadotakewavok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2935/6959/files/20017216984.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1506/1153/files/10707376989.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/49181926903.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/3975/0294/files/6617639453.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6012/4065/files/67679314004.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_006_off00022db1.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x22DB1 33948 bytes
SHA-256: bf68c02219e2f548116ece8cb9e2c815e8d061f95e6a768273a66fd5eb347c01
font_00_sfnt_off0001f691.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F691 5648 bytes
SHA-256: 9522f23a7fc5db5c382f514af0ced65f16c3fbf9bc7951d255b84503637fa3c1
font_01_sfnt_off000209c2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x209C2 10672 bytes
SHA-256: b777a36e5a0fcefb9cac2b07c752b23b7aa125b70aec2e3a15c9ca750a99e970