Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 866ca3e76f6fb1e3…

MALICIOUS

RTF

44.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-25
MD5: 03754fa7d639d85d262b51181879962d SHA-1: b4bc65b6ed0f5b63cd05f0ea5fbd416764c1c731 SHA-256: 866ca3e76f6fb1e345fa6159e2d9a56669b8d036c1a04ac950eb238a4b22187c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content. This combination strongly suggests an exploit attempt leveraging the Equation Editor to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004f51.bin
2589157367f332f9a9950570288e0f57dedc09f45d17b73ed8ad49c0ceb30237
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F51 1800 bytes