Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8655479eb2693e21…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.1 KB Created: 2020-06-08 01:43:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: af816a9074685931c7a114bca1444910 SHA-1: cec63dddc3356839a6b5546c02e3adf94c66c569 SHA-256: 8655479eb2693e21ad107dc2855fc1ec0512400ef3b0f52f0475900ed77339fa
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, identified by the 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' heuristic, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of numerous external URIs, including one with a suspicious URL fragment, indicates an attempt to lure users to external sites. This is consistent with a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://un-mariage-a-la-reunion.fr/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857419/131857419.html#%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7+%25D9%2587%25D9%258A+%25D8%25A3%25D9%2582%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B5+%25D9%2581%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B3%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D9%258A%25D8%25AF+%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2585%25D8%25B3%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AE%25D8%25AF%25D9%2585%25D8%25A9+%25D9%2584
    • http://ozempowerment.co/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590186/9796561.pdf
    • http://happipoki.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621689/7294679.pdf
    • http://fullmetalempiricist.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621093/foferoza.pdf
    • http://webmail.lesliedellavincent.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604544/5628896.pdf
    • http://events.hbade.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639192/6955042.pdf
    • http://btconstruction.info/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607486/wowalamobifo.pdf
    • http://perfectoitaly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739169/finisuvokowopotodu.pdf
    • http://ns.taucrossregion.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381607/lasigus.pdf
    • http://vcvids.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130273610/fupamugorakine_bazekidut.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://wuzonatu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/86190007181.pdf
    • https://fesivalodif.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/79174513120.pdf
    • https://pevewedawisu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/62858857065.pdf
    • https://jidematapaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/67843416087.pdf
    • https://verisemi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/32479111746.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off0000c974.bin
f2c64452a0aad8a4f20628c1b67b3c92b8d1e1806b0edf0dc26f29cc793aaa1b
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xC974 32724 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000101cf.bin
86ce586d1fda3dbe07948295a5570084760376973043d2d23a03a3e823c78518
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x101CF 8144 bytes