Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8652b3a9b60c4a79…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

338.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-24
MD5: cfb2ba7197cd26dfe295845e94f673f6 SHA-1: d96276923f80b981f0336dd1e0f9a4168a54370d SHA-256: 8652b3a9b60c4a797b18835298dadae3f3ec7c12bfc7609f67b62c1b53e6acfb
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of this vulnerability. The VBA macros extracted do not contain executable statements, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object strongly suggests an attempt to exploit this known vulnerability for initial execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
3be50cd91f75ea93eedf3d6e91a9dd75af4e14f2204e4f78847d2c4ed03f2960
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD016303B1/Ole10nATIve 2078 bytes