Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 4

• Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
  PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 234 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
• Image-only PDF lure with a single link to a non-reputable host medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE_NONREPUTABLE_LINK
  PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its only clickable action is a single external link to a host that is not known-good. This is the canonical malspam carrier shape — a screenshot-like 'click to view' page whose sole purpose is to funnel the victim to one redirect/landing URL on a compromised or throwaway domain. Flagged suspicious rather than malicious because the link alone (no shortener / typosquat / brand path) is the only corroborator beyond the image lure.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://loams.filecloudtrial.com/url/file In PDF document text

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0aIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000058.bin)

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