Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 864fd241f052d4f5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

298.1 KB Created: 2023-02-14 05:27:15 First seen: 2023-02-14
MD5: 49e55370798abca611e43f9e2acdc42f SHA-1: 5876e6029211e449ee7dec014474a05958755736 SHA-256: 864fd241f052d4f5e4efc5866b6b204ed7f9d4fc848b91f1e5ea91543b7340ab
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File Execution T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-8570. This vulnerability allows for the dropping and execution of a script, likely a second-stage payload, when the object is activated. The document body presents itself as a proforma invoice, a common lure for malicious documents.

Heuristics 5

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000fe38.bin
2a92ec703529139a869a02f92e87e53e2a2b3862bfccec866d706cf96624c722
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xFE38 25012 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca0e.bin
d32c339173aa9d88c2fe74c67a644a7c6a2d63b30cef91711f8622ec7b959672
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA0E 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0001dfb1.bin
142dc43284d9abe994719f8fb67bc4c04bfc3f07528a1a66b0bad7e552ee8e78
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DFB1 12297 bytes