Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 862017b5c9f9560f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.4 KB
MD5: 08435a109c21369fa003c58016e6a32f SHA-1: 1adf4887bccba99a1e3d37bf85ef02fd561ef5ff SHA-256: 862017b5c9f9560ffe30c5a7627914e44cd1f7e6e6db2e7077d46542de3bb553
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, leading to the execution of malicious code. The embedded object data, when decoded, likely contains the exploit payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the heuristics strongly indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000019f5.bin
da75394a8502d220b34d53729e14d8d33dc20d5bdcfb84b1aedb6e78100e0621
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19F5 1596 bytes