Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 860d5d42d8fe1e1e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

954.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-27
MD5: 396bcf1d5d021453aad5aa4b62341f64 SHA-1: f663278153eff0f83e303167287615b3ce03d64d SHA-256: 860d5d42d8fe1e1e4da37b4373a40826b6164d0ae092b6a81cdac85f46b0f878
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an Excel document containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to deliver a secondary payload, in this case identified as a PDF file. The PDF itself contains suspicious static findings and is likely the next stage of the attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, indicating the primary execution vector is the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/illustrator/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
088403a9d616299ab31f2744984144abb5c5274ca27bcea79000d64e7ae1b52f		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD003A0A05/Ole10native 2040 bytes
stream_027_off0002ed5b.bin
b1d3870696b037464d54072ab0c6b02a60531ec979a87ca3c76ba3f09ac802ca		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2ED5B 457920 bytes
icc_00_off00056af5.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x56AF5 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00057b87.bin
8b9b49d3bcfcf773b551db446dd8c0b0b9077e2c0780475adbef04da72583906		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x57B87 1764 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
0cbcb26c039ada88e7eea4adf77387461d46abf53e4c6ee210c647049df61050		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 972800 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018a00.pdf
d278429a493b29ef6eb16f70cc510cc05968385e276c7f9776930cf6a9411a7d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18A00 876032 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00063200.pdf
46d509ad52c152b4221b168f33b727ecf49738eb248446481e6fe74c8acd6ccc		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x63200 570880 bytes

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