Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 85fdf27f83885304…

MALICIOUS

RTF

34.7 KB First seen: 2023-07-04
MD5: 904a7777ae86d1364b590d38cdea2b7b SHA-1: f884870c741481e5600427456452131ae3e920ed SHA-256: 85fdf27f838853042df02b42bc9de3dbfe921436e341497da60fcd07787ea31a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, which is a known method for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', indicating a social engineering attempt to bypass security measures and execute the embedded exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000052e2.bin
7bdc35a0a3f4b0723650548f07f693397c9c5a02f4688080af207afb1133aca1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x52E2 1546 bytes