Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 85e83d4a3e49d980…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.3 KB Created: 2020-09-09 23:31:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5bff8d01c4026bc024b6aa6c430b52a5 SHA-1: d0a41e7faf897ba4c51ae6b0bb440d559edf7743 SHA-256: 85e83d4a3e49d980880ff6bb3ed0390a17b13c05034a10368fa127a39515d9a5
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external PDF files, a technique often used to create SEO link farms for malicious purposes. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that matches the redirector link, suggesting the document's primary purpose is to drive traffic to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/wix?keyword=aprendizajes+clave+pdf+primaria+segundo+grado
    • http://puweba.pctmedical.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738730/9180039.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0609/9605/files/brother_hl-l2340dw_installation_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5848/7715/files/gizugipovikazitubu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8770/7812/files/buzzer_alarm_tone_free.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0600/9242/files/about_myself_format_for_interview.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f46427_b1700753d35f41bdba999b538762861c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/909b15_fb05184f11414c5da1e0b78d55d2bd04.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b6bf5b_1c80edb8ba2e4a17954261296abc3e2c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c70c35_43ce1328192c4ab59f59a790f90604b7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/82e28d_b481c51f3d3241169657b0f01c806b36.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c34aa9_e03767d04c0045bdb13140906556963b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/01bc73_718b8eb5e2e941d696a3902e024b9fab.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/bae363_28ddc53797b24ae5ae15cbe56bda5a11.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://savannah.gnu.org/projects/freefont/
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/
    • http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c9e6.bin
127b44c9f93874c96d25eb7ddc4688780d8877ce931cf296363fb5748d8d514b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC9E6 6744 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dacd.bin
f1745ef94e2f1bf5d3efaf4dcdd70fe22559aa16ff1c82d54bd6a0b35a930fbd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDACD 5648 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ee00.bin
8770a9d16f6ec8ed1e04f7f31595c1fd3834ff76ff6f55291086ab87d6d749e8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE00 2268 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000f812.bin
af0ab07f94b3c205000d10f6f680f7a3b8eab78578f79bde2033228bca919104		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF812 11588 bytes

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