Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 857e6fde1e764d76…

MALICIOUS

PDF

138.8 KB Created: 2021-06-30 03:06:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 11f190c673ceff4c6604bfd85a78287f SHA-1: dd1f8c9200ee167c6ac6e8830401f71ccc987fc4 SHA-256: 857e6fde1e764d763e7c7a80c5b0e2e8218b00fc16d4158005a44375aba5875c
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous external URIs pointing to various websites, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress installations or disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing sites or download further malware. The document body is unreadable, but the heuristic firings clearly show a link farm pattern designed to obscure the final malicious destination.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9913

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=cockroach+has+type+of+mouthparts PDF link annotation
    • https://pakistanchristiancongress.org/userfiles/file/69707165522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jiangsutravel.kr/userfiles/files/20210613_233150.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.deep2001.com/images/library/File/badipodevutepobaliri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.vedaaz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/281fb91a16c67cc6578fa12aa9ec0cd5/dolezutufubupejolib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://micsys.in/userfiles/file/runarifagofakifuwazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.northamericatalk.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d6015e954a---paxakavep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160929e20bad7d---95634836790.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://ferado.vn/userfiles/file/tiderozetuliwezep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://airflow-skateboards.com/upload/file/dumajipovarewan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dadosefatos.net.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5bce023e12---vigusavovimokujizegaxeva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.kidnuri.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a09687a3fa5---sesawexub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zuche0551.com/upload/file/68706388518.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agilitynd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9797cb675d721ac328a811e0ad8d8d02/mowigelizodunomiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mamproducciones.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160dbae512e2e6---zoxisow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.acefence.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078ea3b55ed9---voresubilejuverula.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://careerhack.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adb029ed603---27095935122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://minerva-collection.net/files/files/49524611695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bracyfamilyreunion.com/clients/c/c2/c2db1a97f769835965582c74015c7782/File/89626965417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://clubforeducation.com/FCKeditor/userfiles/file/28569934720.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://serendipityorlando.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5e985d566c---11190686046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wang023spa.com/userfiles/202106file/2021061714051870554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.julitolaschools.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d204e6516b2---xuzuvuserirulepawoni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://snabavto.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073194429cb4---duxabakepisodebefadux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.franklinwebdesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607919e6a15f4---78350085337.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001b2bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B2BD 10840 bytes
SHA-256: c712ed26dbc167d793cd4564d6c9271da99b90adacbb4e2f9ad8a4cd7d393549
font_01_sfnt_off0001cbe8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1CBE8 22852 bytes
SHA-256: 50f20f083dfb4a4df3bf00629b3501bb8618b09ecf32a05a9ea452fc643191a9
font_02_sfnt_off0002058f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2058F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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