Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 85446b9f35a05b6a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

74.8 KB First seen: 2023-01-19
MD5: a414074b0457e5044eb4455a7500278a SHA-1: f7e7f79df5a26285838a202c08b2b84f6f8f12a7 SHA-256: 85446b9f35a05b6a99c5be772d6a8600fd20307a4c182c950000fc06997ef1e8
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable content. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004148.bin
f9af126b49c1dc76b8e18e9ad1614825112b4d054b7536b34c6a1c453813fb12
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4148 1563 bytes