Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 84fec53104dacb65…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.1 KB
MD5: 9959d407a749bd1e62be0b694b14fa36 SHA-1: d99f4eb935e83b7d08b1ae1c52717648faebb253 SHA-256: 84fec53104dacb65fa87340eba3cfa241dcb5d751cf809a45cce4a1371b143b9
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, indicated by the RTF_OBJDATA heuristic. The RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly suggest that these embedded objects are configured to automatically execute when the document is opened. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload from a remote location. The specific nature of the payload cannot be determined from the provided evidence, but the overall mechanism points to a malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001ba9.bin
6b42342199200294bd673d5ae1096b4d99a0479a7ffb3baa0898ebbed4a0a069
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BA9 1776 bytes