Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 84bfc198d5f1a425…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

80.3 KB
MD5: 782bf6bf070651e4c1686e55d4824b4d SHA-1: 6b0b519cf5b0f6dd38824969cb96987919c6b22c SHA-256: 84bfc198d5f1a42529d34c36cdb55b30352842e9a0db87625fed4cad78cb12ac
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting Microsoft Equation Editor, specifically the CLSID and OLE object data. The \objupdate directive suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000746.bin
cbae20f6c2e8e7f3c7fae1fbe1eb5f453e3188385204861b676326e1715fb180
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x746 4160 bytes