RTF malware analysis — malicious · 84add5fb1be01e64

MALICIOUS

RTF

35.5 KB First seen: 2023-06-03

MD5: bb05581c977504151945ce548b13daf8 SHA-1: 72a82b87deb13b804b5600f0c0d963d6fce7150a SHA-256: 84add5fb1be01e64b6f3b84536d3363d5fc23a3547342e0f33c9646da05e6317

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a suspicious Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The heuristic SE_ENABLE_LURE suggests the document also contains a lure to enable macros or editing, common for malware droppers. The primary goal appears to be exploiting the Equation Editor to gain execution, likely for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000054f5.bin` `eb188e1893a19160560cf7667139b6609f676e60117b96f8c73c9189f23a12b4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x54F5	1839 bytes

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