Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 849636362e137b70…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.1 KB Created: 2021-08-14 21:52:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: b686eb1dcb78b2d1d8ce8009a7e8a51c SHA-1: 627eb0c5d4fe53088523c21b0ea7d8cce8f9de7a SHA-256: 849636362e137b7027113814125efad02ce97fcca5f47d849e624f8c255c323b
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple links to compromised WordPress upload storage and disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic suggests the document's content is intended to trick users into clicking these links, likely for phishing or malware delivery. ClamAV detection and ML classification further confirm its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pirac.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5a1ed14f83048da1a6cf4be995041095/duzodoke.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://suportti.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e56e7376bc1---37127913037.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.peeryhotel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a2289a8e508f4943d5014e0d2bd7cfd3/jajeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.straightmyteeth.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/55df887a6d81a945c161663382b68ec1/12487356034.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://home18.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/180a4a41dde003597cf6f7d55ad14428/waxejubizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bangdinhphucat.com/quangbasanpham/app/webroot/upload/image/files/50236335051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tamker.hu/userfiles/file/vujaxivema.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://auto-rujo.com/images-editor/file/jodejokefenovopilo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lumisolar.pe/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16074487718c64---dazesavela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://northstarexecutivesearch.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0e909082478e4cb98d077f428a8e6f13/litazogareginopixaneko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://msr-hudsonproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bb51155e2fe01a6ff13364188bb0f678/58445170015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://clear-es.net/yamituki-n/uploads/files/temikaneralaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://myboydfamily.com/clients/7/7f/7f513a2250c12de81a70a6735749c289/File/bewenuwobepegolopan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://victorylimo1.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086a3ab12dda---wileb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://saludocupacionalpso.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160757c92a1314---kunasibuxenurasizuwemibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kargiskola.ge/myadmin/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pexeberuvo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nirmalujjwal.com/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/78815858464.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pekingtogo.com/uploads/files/kovikedozobuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baigiangtoanhoc.com/upload/files/sagisotikuxizup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jerseybankruptcylaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/68454927439.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.investing-in-women.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ee3b0e6af40---motomatenuvaruzafenoso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokeocncafe.com/uploads/files/bipusemoda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nffcd.org/userfiles/files/43799791628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arab-hams.com/Ups/files/mesetewikopakupupoxada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=how+does+ats+software+workPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f96b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF96B 10272 bytes
SHA-256: ed7011aec7d32756f83b5c4a46aee9695fee612fe8ff0cd7c8caac4520f612ab
font_01_sfnt_off000110b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110B9 17272 bytes
SHA-256: 9952ee69b12dfbdabdb385632f8c066cdec9527ecefcdc8badd85760ec82e5c9
font_02_sfnt_off00013dd5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13DD5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1