Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 844ebca8f7ddb670…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

372.2 KB Created: 2022-08-06 06:08:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-09
MD5: 64fb8fc7cb07cd20e401b2572097f026 SHA-1: e616b53f365291659ec8f7df43157a2a6e3c15ae SHA-256: 844ebca8f7ddb670546010281644aed3f385ddec657e16c8cc67e1ac2bee507b
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The sample is an Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The presence of embedded artifacts like 'ooxml_oleobject_00.bin' and 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin' further supports this finding.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
4276c71a59de11410c80b1a540ebf63e66790a7d3dc50a905700f91b1f8fecf0		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 196608 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d3a1f60ea14732313b3fac061adb80e34ff83c9c53d1603af8806a5015e2cbed		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 192075 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
36ac22738e24e987eb9d553de039016008e69b0e9ad96a260bf4dabd776a04fa		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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