Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8444ff48abea2909…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.22 MB
MD5: d0119919b2546958464fefae175c83d4 SHA-1: 9d578e562974bc3b289407df8998dc89abf78c32 SHA-256: 8444ff48abea290987c2397b28ecce87ca7b1cbdfeeb8827bb5bb57a6a6e227b
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor. The RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics confirm this. The embedded object is likely designed to execute a secondary payload, although the specific details of that payload are not fully extractable from the provided evidence. The presence of ".\"Client.vbs\"" in the DOC BODY suggests a potential VBScript execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
b54f767b8e8eb8b13fa6f1042b6e7aa6e8caea7f1eef25cc6e00ba0ab9487929		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 26848 bytes
objdata_01_off0001c781.bin
3f280091858d9d9519b7ced6291e0013cd7c45c5838a24fbc74c6833281e0ecd		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C781 479180 bytes

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