IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 843273eaab176dff…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.1 KB Created: 2021-11-10 09:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: ac36c5765ddeed8a6ad463b8e9fc12b8 SHA-1: f1740dff265649412c9c8d7cbca6f46e072cbbd6 SHA-256: 843273eaab176dff734faabd41f8096e1912694efcf1a65c8e59ca1bbfe8f432
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine, which is a common technique for malicious Office documents. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command that appears to save a file to disk and then execute it. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID' strongly suggests the IcedID family. The reconstructed command executed by the script is 'c:\windows\explorer ' which is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bb7070cf515c6571ed82a1aa100a252bdd63e9dbdd7d3d64510e6ca032685fb9		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 949 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
0e80409801572373b0e0b6ac4f3c53850d6c668cd705e4e30010c1a28b8836e9		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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