Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8422180715a44f2f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.2 KB First seen: 2023-05-08
MD5: 421b29969daff3c5a742f3d49a23854b SHA-1: 4584baa6d7c8c943a442484978108410a81acb08 SHA-256: 8422180715a44f2f71122379534ff992fd48a484c98940c7cb5bc0013b08326b
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic to bypass macro security. This suggests the primary goal is to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability via the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004575.bin
8499e9b5b754605886fd21fbef96f88bdec06d12691488f422a79b063c7724ca
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4575 1518 bytes