Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8421df9549446904…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.3 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 06646dda904934fa2f050c7dee98fc38 SHA-1: 8837435476f116e590f3f24a839e7bc51816eaa5 SHA-256: 8421df9549446904b904d24e6053d74d1e5095a09b929bc3f19e37021138a2df
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers the execution of other VBA subs which ultimately use CreateObject to download a file from 'http://statswatt.bar/preview.jpg' and save it as 'C:\users\Public\ro.jpg'. This indicates a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
62a5ff44e56dfb363598684765bd199d35404219857be73c5427e87c568233d6		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2323 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d9334b5286726c92181a3ad027fda76f7c8e50eef1cce662bd0f2d622632d7e3		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 100352 bytes

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