RTF malware analysis — malicious · 84111bdbf530f83f

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.3 KB First seen: 2023-05-30

MD5: 9c11fd374548d363c4ee99e20db792e8 SHA-1: ac8b6009b4afa101bc5ae2ce565101a4ae7fc6c2 SHA-256: 84111bdbf530f83fb7ac96b956f675336319d0e3ef61a27331c98054afa85b2c

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The primary goal appears to be the execution of a malicious payload via the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000476d.bin` `0eafef58d32e5db2a342c2a56372ecb2c114c080a30a3e6c7c39d5e6a546c90d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x476D	1491 bytes

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