RTF malware analysis — malicious · 83fff0354fe26d0b

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.2 KB First seen: 2023-02-15

MD5: 9af95a4d9624dc46640eef313ca771a0 SHA-1: 5f4d320379b5b1956658d77fa7ffe8825e701cae SHA-256: 83fff0354fe26d0bd555881174e99c1240e362c2b62236b075f4c2a736cc1e87

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely triggering an exploit. This exploit is known to download and execute a secondary payload, leading to a malicious infection.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000e03.bin` `8050ff4b2609a219e618ea2916bc7ef421bd94e7d6b010713ada5a84d8a9d3db`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xE03	1672 bytes

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