Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 83cdb6751cd84916…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.7 KB Created: 2020-11-09 16:44:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 9adee02e6e24e29a9569fc544ca67faf SHA-1: 178902ccfda5a40ba2c3b7ed5bf8fa24c1f77dfb SHA-256: 83cdb6751cd84916de6d1a2acf9fb860845c25220b2ac4a531653b40766200f5
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The sample is a PDF document that contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external PDFs hosted on disposable domains. This behavior is indicative of a link farm, likely used for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content. The presence of a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=reynosa+airport+flights In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367013/normal_5f89df9900388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pabaxovazat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134323574/23244de5315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://folarudivol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871739/0cd176d7f89062.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sabidodavo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408103/narixovolog-bibusidutowogo-pedofunalutisif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xulopoxaxuwuzoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134509354/dalowolakaxega_sojotagisut_winugudimubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382778/normal_5f903363d5a9c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406482/normal_5f952edb73b57.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368469/normal_5f90f4dc46e69.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bewupoterefi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380107/tunedilarul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/xutovejiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379984/normal_5f8afa2ab263c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382790/normal_5fa0d38b49185.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384633/normal_5f94e86cd3eb3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwisasivituw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070703/b115421be4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/1541774.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gotijejaj/family_guy_quest_for_stuff_cheat_codes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b43.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B43 5272 bytes
SHA-256: d2780df1765da6db05bf2125531900aff2318b938d0cc7e9c142a357385e073d
font_01_sfnt_off00007d3b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D3B 10756 bytes
SHA-256: 4e7e235297b9eece937b17c35d0745f232df20995ad10bed8e9bf3715d745447

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