Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 83bbd7ae2bcffefd

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

26.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 14.0300

MD5: d407b86ef3f42807d064fe4a8d15f254 SHA-1: be3d8553333c00d786f16a8924df043326ddee0b SHA-256: 83bbd7ae2bcffefd2d63d632f91327eace8bcaebd98adea63b12cdd1164efc2c

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing Excel 4.0 macros, which is a critical finding. The macros utilize WinAPI functions such as URLDownloadToFileA, DownloadToFileA, and ShellExecuteA, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload. The reconstructed URL from the macro is https://mfruits.co/ds/4.gif. This suggests a typical downloader pattern where the initial document serves as a lure to trigger the macro execution and subsequent payload retrieval.

Heuristics 4

Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET

Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS

Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (1 URL) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL

Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL https://mfruits.co/ds/4.gif

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`xlm_sheet_00.bin` `3cc9fed58ee9e6f90f441cf973e0eb01b2c7575a317a07b7ad67aefbf5f18ddf`	xlm-macrosheet	OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin	197528 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.