Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 838f63898e088f85…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2021-04-30 07:29:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 035d5f9a4aad0d01e64deaded37455bf SHA-1: 658bd23ffb639883fc373ef4ef5461c8f2f05adc SHA-256: 838f63898e088f854aadd17f794c723f4ed88245f63e0d9c341891978ce192fc
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is identified as malicious by an ML classifier and exhibits characteristics of a credential phishing attack. It impersonates Facebook and directs users to a link farm hosted on compromised WordPress sites, likely to harvest login details. The document also contains lures related to urgency and password-protected archives, common tactics to bypass security controls and pressure victims.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=accessing+and+ing+fb+information.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mamproducciones.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f534faa786---52319707612.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://suhrsmad.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160873ab51efb4---56279676979.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albatrossmrn.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/83141585881.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.scsi.coop/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/56dd5ce539065fabe3df1a45b5ffef17/56175050442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsinusectomi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d5fc3f290f---vunafavomoworofuxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://manufim.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085d4915ce47---62390630509.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://windcampus.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089f08295c5d---24957794723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nowbali.co.id/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160800ceb2b7e2---49971237324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gamletaarnhuset.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ed24a8c292---37429445020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://expresstestingatl.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/233b291ad70358441de71d351bf78dc0/vemavijudukijeruvilotawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alphaveneers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ff486aa923412f1a88a019a59ceb8612/subafuxeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ideaklinikankara.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083e182a455a---gefabinukuselunegeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.redactordecontenidos.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160748b4ce99b7---didawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.temsilcisitesi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c195522e4c---7406830746.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fullertherapy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070eb0ced2c6---21781336737.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webgirls-studio.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160870d1aee170---sasikasojemepodixipuvil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://retentionstudentexperience.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160803eef6c158---98087652564.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cal.lighting/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/405ec812d30fbe5de2ce35be0f4e4222/58457140213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=accessing+and+ing+fb+informationPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000126b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x126B7 5436 bytes
SHA-256: dc00abe102daaff34edbded153548cddbcb42cecedc3319e4c53bbfffd6da241
font_01_sfnt_off00013923.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13923 11700 bytes
SHA-256: 7dad47a8d88264e8127e4fc9e174840a033a58611ea019795194e4514d7d97af

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