Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 838e9810ffd6ab53…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.96 MB
MD5: e7c8aa88afe0bfcc1dad5c5a24dd5440 SHA-1: 86dd6889fe1e30c77b0b9717d373d5c32c29d9f8 SHA-256: 838e9810ffd6ab535f353603294b896cf116bd5675208330e0358e09e09c7524
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics confirm this. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic indicates that the embedded object is forced to activate, leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The decoded object data suggests an attempt to execute a script, likely for further payload delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001116.bin
ce80c411a6834eee08dcc2932ab960bd29d998328940b460c61cf6216fe4d5bd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1116 25631 bytes
objdata_01_off0001921b.bin
ac9bfb081d4e3f91c1d530b09d33124ea631b81e03f3efc0b3eee9f29b094bb3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1921B 463381 bytes