Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 83885e9f8994240d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.6 KB Created: 2021-07-02 20:00:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: a4f81b1c391c3db8b80b6c84bd4f7f75 SHA-1: 564e81348b3b16f1bfefcab2c522e0093480b793 SHA-256: 83885e9f8994240d88cb7aaa87945601bfe7d87da3a3321c314b97488b1138f4
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple links to external domains, many of which appear to be part of link farms or hosted on compromised WordPress sites. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect the user to a phishing page or download a second-stage payload. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself facilitates the attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.findvoters.com/userfiles/file/26271621916.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://world-green-hope.com/uploads/files/35354109156.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.costaverde.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076543cd955c---zobexan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grupposcorcia.it/userfiles/files/tejubomuzamojamo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://au-coeur-du-temps.com/userfiles/file/rofelatat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anmoul.com/userfiles/file/24607164571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ercrs.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b7962vq8fegqh9a8rf95nkjb3/45810737289.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://floridaholidayplanner.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bd9757b2283102efda4c9596f347d16c/20612965027.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aberdeeneyes.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c1b35bcfc4d---gojevuzasosogilesojol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://megaprestige.ru/uploads/files/salerubewar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://moveisgarciadigital.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609a086edcbe4---8537668723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pogotowienaukowe.com/Upload/file/jusopizaduji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atraba-holding.com/userfiles/file/tigepanibari.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/zususoripajokusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://workprohealth.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609765aae9006---loluropunitupaba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.qookspot.kitchen/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160745e300b9aa---27767975036.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sipare.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dvfv73a6et67q6t6rrjmujnen3/19037868103.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pastoret.it/userfiles/files/wupuzukunoxefuvupunuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ahreco.com/uploads/news_file/34221290923.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mfdesign.hu/files/file/60618783428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://outsourcedbackoffice.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e816d31b551d5a96098069b0f5ef42ee/703058755.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cn-noah.com/uploadfile/file/zinokobekimikupagoko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.myjamaicais.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5187716758ca4dd42005d13be76c68dd/gekulafekaliraneseb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bank-kredit.at/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zuwijarevo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=suez+canal+ever+givenPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f789.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF789 10320 bytes
SHA-256: 29e9449df4ff333b3e7b823109e43f1ee2bc64bea37c80edd4a47525e8d07ca7
font_01_sfnt_off00010ef9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10EF9 17516 bytes
SHA-256: 62b37f02f0fc71a0f8371218d43f6a6afcf4b3cf58ccb5dc62de6a5ea91e5ae4
font_02_sfnt_off00013d3c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13D3C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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