Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 838401abead76f7e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.24 MB Created: 2018-07-27 23:07:00 First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: 30f12c52528d37969d381c849a765883 SHA-1: d13602f9d96ca484b67d446fcef836d62400bcc7 SHA-256: 838401abead76f7ed2135888781e3a54b37aa9fdb0b8be1edeb33a346302b619
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains numerous OLE objects and uses \objupdate to force OLE activation, strongly indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when a vulnerable MSXML version processes the embedded OLE object, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of large hex data blocks within the OLE object further suggests the hiding of malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1019KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 20 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002b06.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B06 20033 bytes
SHA-256: f38bfe7c311ac0bc18927ad55ea3de992852fd12be7b990dfdeb8a7f0145c162
objdata_01_off00012138.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12138 20033 bytes
SHA-256: aba8378cc534394897b23f8ba559f2a74dd11344399182e3ca53e86bb7266272
objdata_03_off00030d9c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x30D9C 20033 bytes
SHA-256: 490cdafa0c7e69f134052c2d52448a335871d2ec129b908c876db3b0023f1d15
objdata_10_off0009c8fa.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9C8FA 20033 bytes
SHA-256: b037b33074982913adcefd2cdeacad3026c36c54ef2562704028dd0e44ab2f69
objdata_17_off00108458.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x108458 20033 bytes
SHA-256: 1b80db8f964d14d625d9af6b5aa2cb2a0367867897b3492bc799efa7506c280d

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