Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8373b3cf2145f517…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.2 KB Created: 2021-08-09 21:55:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 49b77ea043595a056a24f68b1d76a715 SHA-1: c415376912cb3ae1f6801285e03f5ba797926874 SHA-256: 8373b3cf2145f517613496db6b4095e439cc566d4fdac9196383cc0a8759bf09
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to multiple potentially compromised websites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The presence of a 'password-protected archive lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to download an archive and provides a password, a common tactic to bypass gateway security. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm are indicative of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9912

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://alteanetworks.fr/img/file/meloputujemibajabenu.pdf
    • http://fredericjean.net/oplusco/file/domoxejukukijoziza.pdf
    • http://www.onekaddy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078a5ffb4164---lewidumajolu.pdf
    • http://4bx.pl/public/file/kejajotulugibupom.pdf
    • https://www.marjojaspers.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6141994199.pdf
    • http://tieclangman.com/Images_upload/files/tapesa.pdf
    • http://pasted-radio.de/web/files/vowufogukivipa.pdf
    • https://ailani.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/562d16c6627578e7cb9bb5345bd284ca/93793511002.pdf
    • https://www.bountyvacation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608622dda520c---39873774917.pdf
    • http://slowjamsundays.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098ad860394a---bexam.pdf
    • https://ateneoarbonaida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b08be329821---69568174492.pdf
    • https://halobysciton.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b37361d4e25---37401195438.pdf
    • https://coloreverything.love/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cde4311799afb3b316a35690d8cea079/77844566139.pdf
    • https://www.denisonlandscaping.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160885dc880ed5---3821297487.pdf
    • https://tempatpasang.com/contents//files/gerixisodoverejibefupe.pdf
    • https://www.beewellrx.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tmp/6387255070.pdf
    • http://dansensvenner.dk/imagesfile///lojiwoletowakisubewun.pdf
    • https://globalazeri.az/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/es54n70qa1t65e2oahb13lf3b5/fagepilejasusivoguk.pdf
    • https://jetzterstrecht.hamburg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g37heebvcipl1nhit0cu4m2jch/63864578761.pdf
    • https://www.caesarstravel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070abf23759e---59860982537.pdf
    • https://mymovingestimate.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ba228b036382e5c81deca607a45723c8/59676793080.pdf
    • http://hugslock.com/app/webroot/img/files/47964904883.pdf
    • http://usagimatur.com/files/others/pekudu.pdf
    • http://msci.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc4e0d1b74---jokuto.pdf
    • http://nesemlak.com/test/images/uploads/files/fezesasil.pdf
    • http://totaleclipsenv.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b440beda3dc---53739193993.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=does+iphone+11+have+guided+access
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f23d.bin
0beda88e860d348216f0e392bf4f92251c74236aed88469921eb22ddd26d5ff1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF23D 10768 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010ad2.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AD2 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000122e4.bin
8e4c6bd1d50fc9e2e90cc4ec9c9673081fc2b90baab8bd337f2eeade780c6d9f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x122E4 16820 bytes

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