Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 83477f2ff58b5968…

MALICIOUS

RTF

92.9 KB First seen: 2024-07-17
MD5: f4e21b4629aaf817a7bd3410d1910c52 SHA-1: 4de549d33fc53293fc033609f5b881e2c87eb70a SHA-256: 83477f2ff58b5968456aef691436e76c5872e41fdf1c1cd8e37d1bdef243a3a7
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF document contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). This exploit is designed to trigger OLE object activation (RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE) to download and execute a secondary payload. The specific payload and its ultimate destination could not be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000141e.bin
fc7b4916df66922c7bab177a32715aa3b46aa99cc40bffb4a3f351cef90f2b95
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x141E 1841 bytes