Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 833e7d0e3903c4f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.6 KB Created: 2020-08-03 11:13:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0008d0d0e73e01efd936dc260f03b33f SHA-1: d690880cc174fd4bd0f455b17dcbecd51f0e6ea9 SHA-256: 833e7d0e3903c4f60c619a979013f0a5447d9cbf03df1692bae712c5217ad5d8
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous links, many pointing to what appears to be a link farm designed to distribute malicious content, as indicated by the 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' and 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' heuristics. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic suggests the document instructs users to copy and paste content, a common tactic to trick users into executing commands or downloading further malware. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=make+bootable+usb+from+iso
    • http://dakunus.smart-homesolutionsllc.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871745/f5e87ff0f09.pdf
    • http://files.harleybrooks.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775331/rakuginozolu.pdf
    • http://files.papapasseros.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454040/7091498.pdf
    • http://files.missionbeachcentennial.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738720/2182158.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/6387/5486/files/dupagix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9633/4753/files/2012_metal_building_systems_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1370/9730/files/manakobagipeji.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9702/2871/files/72439777793.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/rinubigelezegir.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7503/4520/files/nezurutovunatavog.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5161/3334/files/5279037885.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1326/6846/files/20759039527.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1117/7626/files/aronson_social_psychology_9th_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3975/9259/files/kid_handwriting_font.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6083/0116/files/mufomupakalutazelumom.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8038/4674/files/minecraft_bedrock_edition_entity_id.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8564/3419/files/mifofepufasufunowe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1491/3191/files/lezovokuketutabu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000690e.bin
721bbd02621a28bc1497ebd092d30da05e082753cae77751b541e8956630f545		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x690E 5124 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007a72.bin
797c391e41edea77d2f925fedc991ee1e1176fc91bae239c34da9e1f768324f3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A72 10224 bytes

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