Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 830b610ceb1d011b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.22 MB
MD5: dccf7f98e58bad926533715e366bbbbd SHA-1: 098af8369820612416d5af054050014f9a1f6af8 SHA-256: 830b610ceb1d011bd6af880ef7396971d49d4fd0d1f088297b9b5d26c4d4c5af
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, which is a common method for executing embedded malicious code. The decoded object data suggests an attempt to execute a script, likely for downloading and running a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
6a9a46ed9af7e7579b501f88c60a20c842fb5384ff30018442419b2c3b891b2b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 35705 bytes
objdata_01_off00020cb3.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x20CB3 475057 bytes