Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82fef8c539990274…

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.3 KB Created: 2020-07-10 15:39:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1585d61957746748b13581bc918dd593 SHA-1: 7145bcaf49e5e8e616379317095e769248ca169a SHA-256: 82fef8c539990274e05f3c57bc0585185d6336db23bd4311820ee454080a9a96
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs pointing to various domains, with one specifically identified as a malicious redirector. The document's structure and content suggest it's designed to lure users into clicking these links, potentially for SEO poisoning or to distribute further malicious content. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=hallberg%20rassy%2031%20manual
    • http://files.suncoastsoul.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379612/baretanemomimu.pdf
    • http://files.lovingthemother.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775292/4944382.pdf
    • http://files.connoisseurstours.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857071/abaa266e7dc9a.pdf
    • http://files.henshaw-lab.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438190/41a6c4f8991177.pdf
    • http://files.josepblas.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437268/kiwinorubidosa.pdf
    • http://files.rosyhuephotography.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696263/4732141.pdf
    • http://files.cornellswood4u.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815752/gatopojivomorosup.pdf
    • http://files.artyxan.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775603/gujuvojaviji.pdf
    • http://files.chezharold.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969473/d9b8fa0d9489.pdf
    • http://files.rnnext.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410485/1234302.pdf
    • http://files.hatfieldchurch.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874019/7346a63ccc6d4.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://petunifusam.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/komalowirotul.pdf
    • https://rojazini.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/labunubufabejegiga.pdf
    • https://sobozot.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/79821953277.pdf
    • https://viwedibimu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/diwimuxepenelor.pdf
    • https://rezewer.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/49743376917.pdf
    • https://tugeruvemuf.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/53397935713.pdf
    • https://lawivomeru.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/13653095263.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/75904593322.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/zosakasebiribo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4244/8295/files/nefinalatapusig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/75320426607.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000099ec.bin
95afa8dd239b82b00acc442f988cf4d6f32602fd10cebcfe83fb33d189523f5d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x99EC 5068 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ab0d.bin
5b1999376538b6972461f5f8875fe65984092586c85a5a2d36cf0db5c65ea922		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAB0D 10888 bytes

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