Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82ec30a37edb2859…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.1 KB First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 9bbe87703df81b1f1e9cb883b455fee7 SHA-1: 62f0075fe2e47b44054a19c93ac270eaca884c94 SHA-256: 82ec30a37edb2859a0154a8230d2b776d3a1d3684ceedc24ba06561467ddc09c
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code upon opening the document. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 4138 bytes
SHA-256: 9d57f0802b70f140caa65e7dc28d41d102b75e43956ee9071f0ac4981415e944

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