Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82d2cc37dc2cbe62…

MALICIOUS

PDF

97.1 KB Created: 2021-09-07 02:28:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 4f2b2a7ca950622ef35b51e460c5cc87 SHA-1: 93c75b0695525de705599e8e9b763d5c2cd5f941 SHA-256: 82d2cc37dc2cbe62a93aad91d73b9a6e61270d9cd67a3a5c95707f438c3c3115
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script that references "Windows powershell manual español pdf" and includes links to compromised websites, suggesting a lure to download a malicious payload. The presence of multiple PDF_URI and PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM heuristics further supports the malicious intent. The embedded script itself is XMP metadata and does not contain executable code, but the overall structure and associated URLs indicate a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9822

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.gml.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608bae40c3a13---vomivemam.pdf In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.kinoimaging.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ad835354d4a---zuruxojididofefibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://halvani.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160844d5ce08a4---56391812011.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mytutr.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/091ef818982cb341376896ecd36c0356/wofosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noks.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608063bf835ff---dulogula.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fliesen-brill.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072614054833---lobifaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://somogyplusz.hu/files/sufimezuvorer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://conwaychristian.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160acbafb93bc7---mewuxib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rapabzenec.cz/obrazky/files/fafagawerojabilofokav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.prowallpanama.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/24a28ca7a460d8f833f7b476a2f98d6d/68356576381.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tecnibat.net/uploads/archivos/gowude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ontime-taxi.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4ef35f949d23d283337fdeba98c7478f/7974340496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://totalyoumovement.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161262a2452207---belepef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://businessservicesuk.com/userfiles/file/57309022781.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://divorcioconsensual.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/050e4bcf5566e7ca3fab71bdc692df21/77028692504.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.whirlpool-beachcomber.at/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071183e0c3d7---62896208523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://serviceservice.eu/userfiles/file/lukijimoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ahcxdq.com/uploads/file/012115181348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yakutiaprime.ru/SITE/files/editor/file/kezobunifafij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.physioaktivkramer.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610069d8e8dfe---sitisekesupixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sbhs1967.com/clients/8/89/8985ce50e7417da620f75e2af787291b/File/gagifabodirikewamizixok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://misspacificus.com/clients/873634/File/60359691965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://journeypeople.cc/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c5257b0f50f5200e556521f9f4515372/67356858786.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=windows+powershell+manual+espa%C3%B1ol+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00017e7b.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x17E7B 1719 bytes
SHA-256: 058fe8a277972fa74071ff319f6e6ab6690ae33bf5c520776885645be9132ee4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Smallpdf Desktop'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Wabiwoze Vaziwa</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell manual español pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Windows powershell manual español pdf. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; Warning: Can only dete</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows powershell manual español pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Windows powershell manual español pdf. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; Warning: Can only dete</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell manual español pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-06T18:17:51'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='6f6b2147-30f3-426b-9458-bba498c00e07'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='a5bb88e4-40b9-4ba9-b4f7-e7eb5957b0b4'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e573.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE573 16104 bytes
SHA-256: 4204f4a647e3e8488fc3125e36d68471fcc515b787f7ef36a685bb1e406e82a7
font_01_sfnt_off0000faba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFABA 25004 bytes
SHA-256: 33638da43cfba6bdee504df72c994cfa6f6157605be82f91f38662b0fef07639
font_02_sfnt_off00013947.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13947 11048 bytes
SHA-256: c77f482e509f2ddf561265aecff198bb899ea483dff8ab67092dc25a6b07287f
font_03_sfnt_off0001527e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1527E 1868 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2bb2d94384256bb38bab4c3005c13f44a8b25eb5b232dcefe64ad24aae4b51
font_04_sfnt_off00015b35.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15B35 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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