Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82cd5ed58b2a63b3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

450.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-20
MD5: b4845a241a8c4e8a22e221edd9d9b5d7 SHA-1: 62c760e98d352131474947f3be744a1336d49643 SHA-256: 82cd5ed58b2a63b3098f8322a7f45e2125406125354981716601e5274bcc9c9e
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that leverages CVE-2017-0199 by embedding a weaponized URL. This URL, http://192.3.108.47/214/2/TiWorker.hta, is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload, such as an HTA file. The presence of embedded PDF objects with suspicious static findings further suggests a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, indicating the primary exploit mechanism is the OLE object itself.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker weaponized URL — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE exact CVE_2017_0199_WEAPONIZED_URL
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.108.47/214/2/TiWorker.hta

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
074f92f060cf1e4ef06de10dfc65c9f5ea9f4185c52f94ffdd5cebf55d4a6c86		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 457216 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
b999d404123339f0217f02ef2d77e5212eef9a56c39f0ca1b2f9eeb81000d622		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 435200 bytes

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