Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82b851b8f66aa1ee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

813.8 KB Created: 2021-05-13 12:22:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 0c88e85911c4a8beb40d45bd03e0b0bf SHA-1: 3e98a3c1699d77713b80c0c9b4847b22b24309c6 SHA-256: 82b851b8f66aa1ee6c9473d4520bb99199393592de1c0625549f1c13881dc273
442 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1137.001 Office Application Startup: Office Application Registry Keys

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine that utilizes WScript.Shell to run a constructed command. This command likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection of 'Win.Packed.Zusy-9861419-0' on both the main file and an extracted artifact. The presence of an embedded OLE object with Ole10Native indicators further suggests exploitation of a vulnerability like CVE-2026-21514.

Heuristics 11

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Zusy-9861419-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Zusy-9861419-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b82bc0b14885dd0d3e622af3ef0130a26bb8bda86710b1dad568b9cf5e3dc183
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5487 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
d0ccab37d4cc1c52d1a22e5d9bb2b48fbf738dda660c6917b395ca163cfa1768
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 425472 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Zusy-9861419-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
57b5320fb7a75abb6bf0c16b67dc503307493db1b13e3e87b990ea7817816565
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 413978 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Zusy-9861419-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
vbaProject_00.bin
94dd95a1cc3bdb27b99e551dbc58355a87ac7370f29394ec673058047958dbbf
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 46080 bytes
emf_00.emf
42df48f6fe376328d3c0f28b0601a5994fb24f047ebf9416c0bbdf24bee486b4
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 4964 bytes