Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82b2ce9d2de395c1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

742.5 KB First seen: 2026-05-14
MD5: edc5ed542a1cb0419f425c11e27c55a7 SHA-1: 19f65c99d9d3c0d6895e1538ac301438c3be333a SHA-256: 82b2ce9d2de395c18fd3994daa203d354046f92105e4eaf020a6fcd36e7f226e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a password-encrypted OOXML document identified as an exploit carrier. It contains an Equation Editor OLE object, a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. This technique allows for arbitrary code execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.