Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 82977565b91209ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

367.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 546020a3c9186b24919d8d613d7e112b SHA-1: 8d8f60ea1c0f0f81a099c704c1ad0d684f93ebe9 SHA-256: 82977565b91209efc4010171f14e21a8a0fdab97023c81cdb4bd7d7e41f6604f
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel 4.0 workbook containing an Auto_Open macro, which is a known technique for executing malicious code. The macro is designed to lure the user into enabling content, a common tactic to bypass security warnings. The macro also contains embedded URLs that are likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • XLM Auto_Open workbook with payload URL or enable-content lure critical OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN_PAYLOAD_LURE
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet with Auto_Open / Auto_Close and also exposes a payload URL or enable-content lure in the OLE bytes. This combination is a high-confidence XLM downloader/social-engineering pattern even when formula recovery cannot decode the full macro chain.
  • Excel 4.0 Auto_Open defined name critical OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN_DEFINEDNAME
    oletools recovered an Auto_Open / Auto_Close entry from an Excel 4.0 macro sheet. The raw BIFF name can be tokenized or partially opaque to byte-string checks, but the recovered macro listing confirms the workbook has an XLM auto-execution entry.
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://stateoftheartacademy.com.br/E4V8njAb2/ue.html
    • https://dsafarm.com/h03itpGP/ue.html

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_macros.txt
e808156aa76369abc653ef5da0e4637a11444d74c8ce4e627b8f3942d60b3178
xlm-macro oletools.olevba.extract_all_macros (XLM macro listing) 8209 bytes