Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 825ebffe89d3dd3c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

302.2 KB Created: 2021-05-15 10:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 7df7c71c724e588db8ae91cf540c66d2 SHA-1: 9dd9d1547cb634ceda6dffe8ca51503c3fe90cf0 SHA-256: 825ebffe89d3dd3ca0d3800c4331ca8c84d07341436ea72e72544835e3761759
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a risky file type, specifically an Ole10Native package containing an executable or script (indicated by the .jar extension). This strongly suggests the document is a dropper designed to execute malicious code.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — context-specific rules above attribute URLs they actually evaluated; this rule lists URLs that were present in the bytes but were not otherwise tied to a specific finding.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
cd4c2abb065f996761bc9b8bb1bebf48b81fa754f7459986b85c50c260b8d90c		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 301056 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
daf60c23107bea8e3e52da9f753787bfa6449b9a7be71a8ac2f57d65b1fe543f		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 296439 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
e0466ab687153d430800ebb3f4f7333d9275c35e14e46fa589865e18658c90e3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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