Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8252f688cf5a81b9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-13 13:25:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: 3680479ec8523745626a670e190340a2 SHA-1: 3e441f94f7d815d95e1db4ead7ebe5f402211a40 SHA-256: 8252f688cf5a81b9057ff6c0720320a5ad146f768650036ecab5fd568c23957f
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by a machine learning classifier and ClamAV, indicating it is likely a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism. The presence of a link farm with multiple external URLs, including one pointing to zajinet.ru, suggests an attempt to redirect users to malicious content. The 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic further supports the idea that the document is designed to trick users into clicking on these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://zajinet.ru/123?utm_term=ccleaner+windows+10++chip PDF link annotation
    • https://defasoxajex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131405962/74524ce71d19e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jurivulanikep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134525456/pibiwelasasej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xigobiniliw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/2/135298108/tavudugixo-dibitadutape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21fee977-35b4-43f5-bca9-7bcec7ee579d/countable_and_uncountable_nouns_worksheets_for_grade_6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lososimap/wavudodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c0aefae2-3cec-49c3-81b7-74ab9d827d2e/roligiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nigimul/why_is_a_call_to_action_in_a_speech_important.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7de37393-df1d-4628-a9ac-733c0eb485c4/xebitinunujod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e6608f31-58c1-4725-8a22-06abedc8c85d/86489908692.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/64effe8f-fd6c-46f7-b5f9-3150fb34147e/kavekixadiduxijexan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://3485775d-af35-4505-8fb4-f6750f575e04.filesusr.com/ugd/42f18e_e13869123df74f5bab7665f00250915f.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jagux/speed_queen_washer_and_dryer_large_capacity.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f15013b7-19ac-4d2f-9fc3-b7578a1d9a9e/how_to_connect_to_swann_camera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/geraromu/android_ndk_build_so_file.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3baf5798-5a70-4bbd-bbd4-8ddd0cdb6214/50759449733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kozewuposoridil/how_did_germany_become_so_powerful_in_world_war_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a90d0685-83b7-4fe5-b972-e531f8326018/wilton_12_cavity_brownie_pan_recipes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dc4baa0a-9369-4d4f-8e23-1dd09ef6d9e1/logitech_m325c_pairing.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aeedc83c-a41d-4179-9d48-e770e4c4cd47.filesusr.com/ugd/e010a7_bbfa9481238c4588b0d244252df60849.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://9d50af6f-dbf7-41ba-b854-83985329a12b.filesusr.com/ugd/33c377_49c731560ef04890a21ca9518ec29698.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e8ce.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE8CE 5352 bytes
SHA-256: b85f687411d7414930acd5f98a550f3488d616fa253d5007dd8b8a6f9e250022
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB09 11788 bytes
SHA-256: 018a79a132de5721a5d1306ff9a0d2a75e6b9aca86834a000d3791c63deb39fc